NATO members can and should do more to ensure it can continue to deter Russia from attacking the Alliance under the cover of nuclear threats or even use of nuclear weapons. Russian President Vladimir Putin has employed nuclear threats against the United States and its NATO allies with increasing frequency and intensity since Russia invaded Ukraine again in February 2022. Over the years, Russia has increased the types, numbers, and accuracy of its dual-capable and nuclear weapons intended for battlefield and theater use, while also increasing the frequency and visibility of field exercises and deployments involving these weapons. NATO, for its part, spent more than two decades after the Cold War reducing the number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems assigned to the defense of the alliance as well as all the associated capabilities (such as manpower, infrastructure, and planning).
The U.S. commitment to defend its allies, bolstered by the commitments of the UK and France, provides a solid foundation to NATO’s nuclear deterrence. But other Allies, including those not possessing nuclear weapons, should provide more and stronger pillars to support that roof. Without additional reinforcement the whole edifice may collapse under increasing shocks. The incrementalism in NATO’s efforts to adapt and strengthen nuclear deterrence accepts too much risk of failure as the security environment deteriorates. This risk is compounded by the fact that the US is grappling with the problem of deterring not only Russia, but an increasingly aggressive and nuclear arms racing China, while still providing reassurance to its allies and partners in Asia and the Middle East. However, there are many ways that the NATO allies could strengthen the entire structure of NATO’s nuclear deterrence in ways that require minimal new contributions from the United States.
Editor’s Note: In light of the ongoing conflict, Stimson is committed to presenting a range of perspectives on how to address the escalating threats and aggressive posturing from Moscow. In this policy memo, William Alberque, a Nonresident Fellow with Stimson’s Converging Technology & Global Security program and former director of arms control at NATO, drafted this piece with Artur Kacprzyk, an Analyst at the International Security program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and captures a view from one U.S. allied state – Poland – that sits firmly in Russia’s crosshairs. The piece builds up on Artur’s 2023 PISM report on rationales for NATO nuclear force posture expansion, by presenting a much wider set of options for nuclear adaptation.
By Cindy Vestergaard, Senior Fellow and Director, Converging Technologies and Global Security Program
Introduction
At the NATO Summit in Washington, DC, 9-11 July, Allies maintained their incremental approach to the adaptation of NATO’s nuclear deterrence. The Alliance began to gradually strengthen it after Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014, reversing more than two decades of neglect. NATO’s efforts to date include modernizing U.S. B61 variable-yield guided nuclear bombs stored in Europe and the Allied dual-capable aircraft (DCA) assigned to deliver them under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements; small improvements to nuclear planning, exercises, and strategic communications; and a gradual increase in the Alliance’s understanding of Russia’s nuclear threats.
As the security environment worsens, NATO should take more radical steps to enhance its nuclear deterrence. Russia is resorting to an increasingly aggressive nuclear signaling and ever-expanding its set of nuclear capabilities. NATO’s position is further complicated by the nuclear and conventional force build-up by China, which the United States considers its main rival, and the implied strain deterring China puts on US support to NATO and its Asian allies.
This article builds upon earlier work by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) on this topic by proposing a broader spectrum of options intended to strengthen NATO’s deterrence, with a principal focus on what the NATO Allies other than the United States can do. We base our approach on two main principles:
- Russia is more likely to be deterred if NATO takes on politically difficult steps to strengthen deterrence than if it only takes the relatively politically-cost-free steps.
- Russia is more likely to be deterred if all Allies – not only the United States (and the United Kingdom and France) – take resolute political and military action to support NATO’s nuclear deterrent.
NATO’s Approach to Nuclear Deterrence Must Change
All NATO Allies can contribute significantly more to deterring Russia and sharing the nuclear burden. Broader allied contributions to nuclear deterrence would better signal their resolve to defend each other despite nuclear threats or even use. A wider set of capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, would support more flexible and credible response options, while minimizing the risks of escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange.
Over the past three decades, some of the European Allies – especially Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands – felt constrained by public opinion against any effort to strengthen its nuclear deterrent. By focusing on incrementally strengthening deterrence and avoiding taking more difficult steps, NATO is sending mixed signals about its willingness to defend itself. This increases the risk of another Russian miscalculation. When launching the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin apparently assessed it could easily discourage the Alliance from aiding Ukraine. Continued Russian attempts at nuclear intimidation indicate his belief it might still help him prevail over the West.
NATO’s nuclear gradualism also restrains its options for responding to Russian limited use of nuclear weapons (and thus restoring deterrence in wartime). Russian strategists have long elaborated a theory of nuclear “dosing” – that is, using limited, lower-yield nuclear strikes to control escalation and win any conflict on Russia’s terms without triggering a full-scale nuclear exchange with the United States. Such strikes are intended to “soberise” the West out of any thought that it could defeat Russia in a regional conflict and instead to settle on Russian terms. Russia’s strategy is backed by a force posture that includes a diverse arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons, coupled with a robust doctrine for their use.
Meanwhile, the more precise B61-12 variable-yield guided nuclear bombs and stealthy F-35A fighters are an improvement, but not a panacea for NATO. They will remain to be based in a few airbases that could be struck with Russian missiles. And there will still be a risk of the F-35 being detected and shot down, especially if Russian air defenses improve. While some of U.S. strategic forces can also carry low-yield warheads, U.S. leadership may asses that using them for limited counterattacks would be too likely to be misperceived as a part of larger retaliation, and thus incur too much escalation risk. This pertains especially to the W76-2 warheads on some of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Moreover, in a scenario with simultaneous conflict or risk of conflict with China, the United States may prioritize strategic deployments for the Asian theatre, particularly with regards to the dual-capable heavy bombers.
French and British nuclear forces also contribute to NATO nuclear deterrence, but they are much smaller than the U.S. arsenal, and their contributions are limited in scope and scale. Both countries operate nuclear-armed SLBMs, which provide a survivable retaliatory capability in case of a debilitating first strike. France also has nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM-Ns), which are much better suited to responding to a limited nuclear strike, albeit in small quantities. Moreover, while the UK is integrated into NATO nuclear planning, France has consistently refused to participate in it and has been ambiguous about the possibility of using its nuclear weapons to defend its allies.
Towards a New NATO Nuclear Posture
Since February 2022, the attitudes of many European NATO allies towards weapons have shifted significantly. These allies appear to be more willing to take action to adapt NATO’s nuclear posture deterrent than at any time in the past three decades. It would be useful to present NATO with more far-reaching options to strengthen its nuclear deterrent and maintain the security of the alliance. NATO Allies therefore should focus their further nuclear adaptation on following ten actions:
DCA Certification of More Allied Aircraft
Allies should certify more Allied F-35As for nuclear delivery – outside the current DCA states – along with more NATO 4th generation fighters (including JAS 39 Gripens and Eurofighters) and train more fighter pilots across the Alliance to deliver nuclear bombs. If Russia had to assume that many more Allied fighter jets could deliver B61-12s, it would greatly erode Russia’s confidence that it could destroy NATO’s DCA early in a conflict. This change also would provide the maximum availability of DCA to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for a wider variety of nuclear strike options, and thus provide the maximum deterrent.
Establishment of More Basing Options
NATO should have numerous Dispersal Operation Bases (DOBs) and Untethered Operation Bases (UOBs) as it did in the Cold War, as well as more permanent DCA bases. DOBs are Allied air bases other than the established permanent storage bases, with certified and secured equipment in place to accept nuclear armed aircraft and provide them with maintenance and support for strikes. UOBs are air bases or other austere locations (such as highways – a capability routinely demonstrated by Allies for conventional air operations) suitable for launching strikes, but with no pre-positioned equipment or other indicators that they would host NATO strike aircraft prior to dispersal. The UOB concept is one developed by the U.S. Air Force for the European and Pacific operations, with more than 400 eligible bases and many, many more suitable austere locations.
Additional permanent stationing bases also should be considered, either by spreading the current arsenal of nuclear gravity bombs to more locations or deploying additional bombs from CONUS. Such a posture would make NATO nuclear forces more survivable if Allies were unable to disperse nuclear weapons before a Russian surprise attack. Such bases should be out of range of Russian forward artillery, however, locations further east or north of the Alliance would reduce the time to target.
Broader Participation in Conventional Support for Nuclear Operations (CSNO)
Broader participation in CSNO (formerly known as SNOWCAT) and related exercises will both improve the effectiveness of NATO nuclear forces and send a strong deterrence message through demonstration of political unity. CSNO is critical for the success of NATO’s nuclear mission, including fighter escort, refueling, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and suppression or destruction of enemy air defenses. It also includes indirect support, such as strategic lift, fuel, conventional ammunition, maintenance and repair, base support (guards, food, medical, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense), air and missile defenses, and other cyber, electronic warfare, and space-based enablers. Such support can be supplied by all Allies, including those with limited military capabilities. Strengthening of these capabilities is also needed for the conventional defense of Europe in case of conflict with Russia.
Improvement of NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Messaging
While NATO has improved its nuclear deterrence messaging in recent years, including by enhancing related in language in its summit declarations and declassifying the name of the annual Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise, these efforts have been too limited in scope. The Secretary General and SACEUR are still afforded with too little freedom to speak on these issues, while many Allies often either engage in muddled or contradictory messaging or refuse to discuss their reliance on (or participation in) NATO’s nuclear deterrence. More frequent and coherent nuclear messaging by NATO leadership and the Allies would help both deter Russia and assure Allied populations. NATO should also return to the routine practice of publishing communiques after significant Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meetings to provide transparency of its deterrence work.
Additionally, all Allies should make the public and political case for NATO’s nuclear deterrence policies and posture – including NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. Currently, too many Allies remain silent when Russia, China, and others criticize NATO in public fora. Allies must provide vocal support both in their own capitals and at other regional and international forums such as the Review Process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, all while Allies remaining united and vocal in their opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Development of NATO-wide Nuclear Resilience
One of the most important aspects of deterrence by denial is the ability to demonstrate full preparedness for worst-case scenarios – a short-notice Russian nuclear strike or limited regional nuclear exchanges. Required changes include hardening all critical airports and seaports (especially the pre-designated airports and seaports critical to NATO reinforcement) to operate in radiological environments. Allied armed forces require improved chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRN-D) protection, with an emphasis on the oft-neglected aspect of nuclear defense, both in Europe and in Allied and partner territory in Asia.
This work also would require all Allies to prepare their publics for the possibility of nuclear strikes, to update their strategic communications and national nuclear response readiness plans, and to exercise these regularly, both internally and at NATO. Such work must be carefully designed and intelligently executed to ensure this increases public confidence rather than increasing concern. It also should include the European Union and other European and Asian partner nations, which can contribute to necessary medical and CBRN-D capabilities.
Improvement of Allied IAMD
NATO’s lack of sufficiently connected and capable integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) against Russian/Belarusian nuclear strikes is a well-known capability shortfall. Russia’s war against Ukraine shows the need for forward-deployed IAMD, towards a vision of fully integrated air-space missile defense for the Euro-Atlantic region. Such a system would minimize Russia’s confidence in its ability to use a small number of nuclear armed missiles to penetrate NATO defenses for a limited “dosing” strike.
Improvements to NATO IAMD will require the purchase, deployment, and wide integration of systems to reduce vulnerabilities to Russia’s theatre strike dual-capable systems. Such work will require radars and mounted and portable air-defense systems closer to the borders of Russia and Belarus, as well as cruise missile detection and shoot-down capabilities, as well as counter-EW and counter-penetration capabilities. In longer-term, NATO should make similar enhancements to counter other threats, such as future longer-range Iranian missiles.
Enhanced Nuclear Planning and Exercising
After the end of the Cold War, NATO ceased its nuclear contingency planning, to which it returned only recently. NATO should accelerate its efforts to improve and integrate nuclear planning across all domains, including at SHAPE, at NATO HQ, and in Allied capitals – both within militaries and governments, and with the expert community. It must be integrated into every aspect of Alliance strategy and NATO’s new defense plans and build into NATO’s regular work. This work must include improved understanding of, and agreement upon, pre-delegation roles for SACEUR in increasing alert and survivability of nuclear forces in case of surprise attack.
The re-integration of conventional and nuclear exercises is also necessary and overdue. NATO segregated them after the end of the Cold War. Currently, NATO aims for coherence in its exercises, but this is insufficient and does not reflect the complexity of a potential conflict with Russia. Both field and headquarters exercises must reflect a holistic view across all domains.
Establishment of Additional Nuclear Delivery Systems
The effectiveness, and hence the credibility, of NATO nuclear deterrence would gain from theatre-range missiles that could strike deeper into Russia and with greater chance of penetrating air defenses than the DCA with gravity bombs. Prospective re-introduction of U.S. nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) will be a step in this direction, but, as an off-shore U.S. system, it will have limited value for joint NATO signaling and could be prioritized for deterrence missions in the Pacific instead of the Atlantic.
NATO Allies instead could work to develop nuclear-capable ALCMs, including replacing or supplementing the B61-12 with nuclear armed AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER). This would capitalize on the Allied investments being made in F-35As. Deployment of nuclear-capable missiles on mobile launchers, such as those carrying conventional Typhon Mid-Range Capability, would additionally improve survivability of NATO’s nuclear forces. Europeans could provide such a capability, potentially by modifying the conventional ground-launched cruise missile which is to be developed by France, Germany, Italy, and Poland.
Strengthening Conventional Response and Counterforce Options
NATO allies should provide SACEUR with enhanced conventional strike options, not just for purposes of conventional defense and supporting nuclear operations. They could be also employed to degrade Russian non-strategic nuclear forces or in retaliation to some scenarios of limited nuclear use (similarly to South Korean Kill Chain and Massive Punishment and Retaliation concepts). Both uses could occur either instead of NATO allies employing their nuclear weapons or in tandem with them. Relevant capabilities include conventionally armed cruise missiles launched from air, ground, and the sea, as well as longer-range artillery systems (e.g., Precision Strike Missile for HIMARs), airpower, and specially-trained covert penetration special operations forces. Integrated anti-submarine warfare would also help in preventing sea-launched non-strategic nuclear strikes.
Improved French and UK Contributions to NATO’s Nuclear Deterrent
Further steps can be taken to improve the French and UK contributions to NATO, including enlarging and diversifying their nuclear force postures. France could join in NATO nuclear planning, but as long as this remains unlikely, it could better coordinate its nuclear exercises (such as POKER) and related strategic communication, and regularly deploy French dual-capable aircraft and submarines to Allied bases. France also could share development of its ASMP-R, the latest generation of its ALCM, or transfer its outmoded ASMP-A to Allies. This would not include sharing warheads, but instead adapting U.S. warheads for delivery.
The UK also can play a role, perhaps in modifying some of its advanced ALCMs to deliver UK (or U.S.) nuclear warheads, or independently developing a SLCM-N assigned to the defense of the Alliance. It also can incorporate its nuclear exercises with NATO and invest in F-35As and have them certified as DCA, thus returning to a role it had in the Cold War.
Conclusion
While NATO allies do not need to match Russian nuclear capabilities warhead for warhead and system for system, they could do much more than they currently are doing to enhance nuclear deterrence. Russia likely will complain about all of these changes, claiming NATO is escalating and that Russia once again is the victim of NATO predations. But as Russia escalates its nuclear threats and aggressive actions, NATO members continue to show too much self-restraint. By maintaining an overly constrained and incremental approach to nuclear adaptation, the Allies are tolerating too much risk of deterrence failure. It is important for NATO to enact some, if not all, of farther-reaching options to improve NATO’s nuclear posture. In this regard, it is worth to recall a metaphor by Sir Michael Quinlan, who compared the development of NATO’s nuclear posture with building a solid roof: ‘it cannot be doubted that the roof needed pillars; and that it was safer with too many than with too few.’
NATO members can and should do more to ensure it can continue to deter Russia from attacking the Alliance under the cover of nuclear threats or even use of nuclear weapons. Russian President Vladimir Putin has employed nuclear threats against the United States and its NATO allies with increasing frequency and intensity since Russia invaded Ukraine again in February 2022. Over the years, Russia has increased the types, numbers, and accuracy of its dual-capable and nuclear weapons intended for battlefield and theater use, while also increasing the frequency and visibility of field exercises and deployments involving these weapons. NATO, for its part, spent more than two decades after the Cold War reducing the number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems assigned to the defense of the alliance as well as all the associated capabilities (such as manpower, infrastructure, and planning).
The U.S. commitment to defend its allies, bolstered by the commitments of the UK and France, provides a solid foundation to NATO’s nuclear deterrence. But other Allies, including those not possessing nuclear weapons, should provide more and stronger pillars to support that roof. Without additional reinforcement the whole edifice may collapse under increasing shocks. The incrementalism in NATO’s efforts to adapt and strengthen nuclear deterrence accepts too much risk of failure as the security environment deteriorates. This risk is compounded by the fact that the US is grappling with the problem of deterring not only Russia, but an increasingly aggressive and nuclear arms racing China, while still providing reassurance to its allies and partners in Asia and the Middle East. However, there are many ways that the NATO allies could strengthen the entire structure of NATO’s nuclear deterrence in ways that require minimal new contributions from the United States.
Editor’s Note: In light of the ongoing conflict, Stimson is committed to presenting a range of perspectives on how to address the escalating threats and aggressive posturing from Moscow. In this policy memo, William Alberque, a Nonresident Fellow with Stimson’s Converging Technology & Global Security program and former director of arms control at NATO, drafted this piece with Artur Kacprzyk, an Analyst at the International Security program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and captures a view from one U.S. allied state – Poland – that sits firmly in Russia’s crosshairs. The piece builds up on Artur’s 2023 PISM report on rationales for NATO nuclear force posture expansion, by presenting a much wider set of options for nuclear adaptation.
By Cindy Vestergaard, Senior Fellow and Director, Converging Technologies and Global Security Program
Introduction
At the NATO Summit in Washington, DC, 9-11 July, Allies maintained their incremental approach to the adaptation of NATO’s nuclear deterrence. The Alliance began to gradually strengthen it after Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014, reversing more than two decades of neglect. NATO’s efforts to date include modernizing U.S. B61 variable-yield guided nuclear bombs stored in Europe and the Allied dual-capable aircraft (DCA) assigned to deliver them under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements; small improvements to nuclear planning, exercises, and strategic communications; and a gradual increase in the Alliance’s understanding of Russia’s nuclear threats.
As the security environment worsens, NATO should take more radical steps to enhance its nuclear deterrence. Russia is resorting to an increasingly aggressive nuclear signaling and ever-expanding its set of nuclear capabilities. NATO’s position is further complicated by the nuclear and conventional force build-up by China, which the United States considers its main rival, and the implied strain deterring China puts on US support to NATO and its Asian allies.
This article builds upon earlier work by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) on this topic by proposing a broader spectrum of options intended to strengthen NATO’s deterrence, with a principal focus on what the NATO Allies other than the United States can do. We base our approach on two main principles:
- Russia is more likely to be deterred if NATO takes on politically difficult steps to strengthen deterrence than if it only takes the relatively politically-cost-free steps.
- Russia is more likely to be deterred if all Allies – not only the United States (and the United Kingdom and France) – take resolute political and military action to support NATO’s nuclear deterrent.
NATO’s Approach to Nuclear Deterrence Must Change
All NATO Allies can contribute significantly more to deterring Russia and sharing the nuclear burden. Broader allied contributions to nuclear deterrence would better signal their resolve to defend each other despite nuclear threats or even use. A wider set of capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, would support more flexible and credible response options, while minimizing the risks of escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange.
Over the past three decades, some of the European Allies – especially Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands – felt constrained by public opinion against any effort to strengthen its nuclear deterrent. By focusing on incrementally strengthening deterrence and avoiding taking more difficult steps, NATO is sending mixed signals about its willingness to defend itself. This increases the risk of another Russian miscalculation. When launching the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin apparently assessed it could easily discourage the Alliance from aiding Ukraine. Continued Russian attempts at nuclear intimidation indicate his belief it might still help him prevail over the West.
NATO’s nuclear gradualism also restrains its options for responding to Russian limited use of nuclear weapons (and thus restoring deterrence in wartime). Russian strategists have long elaborated a theory of nuclear “dosing” – that is, using limited, lower-yield nuclear strikes to control escalation and win any conflict on Russia’s terms without triggering a full-scale nuclear exchange with the United States. Such strikes are intended to “soberise” the West out of any thought that it could defeat Russia in a regional conflict and instead to settle on Russian terms. Russia’s strategy is backed by a force posture that includes a diverse arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons, coupled with a robust doctrine for their use.
Meanwhile, the more precise B61-12 variable-yield guided nuclear bombs and stealthy F-35A fighters are an improvement, but not a panacea for NATO. They will remain to be based in a few airbases that could be struck with Russian missiles. And there will still be a risk of the F-35 being detected and shot down, especially if Russian air defenses improve. While some of U.S. strategic forces can also carry low-yield warheads, U.S. leadership may asses that using them for limited counterattacks would be too likely to be misperceived as a part of larger retaliation, and thus incur too much escalation risk. This pertains especially to the W76-2 warheads on some of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Moreover, in a scenario with simultaneous conflict or risk of conflict with China, the United States may prioritize strategic deployments for the Asian theatre, particularly with regards to the dual-capable heavy bombers.
French and British nuclear forces also contribute to NATO nuclear deterrence, but they are much smaller than the U.S. arsenal, and their contributions are limited in scope and scale. Both countries operate nuclear-armed SLBMs, which provide a survivable retaliatory capability in case of a debilitating first strike. France also has nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM-Ns), which are much better suited to responding to a limited nuclear strike, albeit in small quantities. Moreover, while the UK is integrated into NATO nuclear planning, France has consistently refused to participate in it and has been ambiguous about the possibility of using its nuclear weapons to defend its allies.
Towards a New NATO Nuclear Posture
Since February 2022, the attitudes of many European NATO allies towards weapons have shifted significantly. These allies appear to be more willing to take action to adapt NATO’s nuclear posture deterrent than at any time in the past three decades. It would be useful to present NATO with more far-reaching options to strengthen its nuclear deterrent and maintain the security of the alliance. NATO Allies therefore should focus their further nuclear adaptation on following ten actions:
DCA Certification of More Allied Aircraft
Allies should certify more Allied F-35As for nuclear delivery – outside the current DCA states – along with more NATO 4th generation fighters (including JAS 39 Gripens and Eurofighters) and train more fighter pilots across the Alliance to deliver nuclear bombs. If Russia had to assume that many more Allied fighter jets could deliver B61-12s, it would greatly erode Russia’s confidence that it could destroy NATO’s DCA early in a conflict. This change also would provide the maximum availability of DCA to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for a wider variety of nuclear strike options, and thus provide the maximum deterrent.
Establishment of More Basing Options
NATO should have numerous Dispersal Operation Bases (DOBs) and Untethered Operation Bases (UOBs) as it did in the Cold War, as well as more permanent DCA bases. DOBs are Allied air bases other than the established permanent storage bases, with certified and secured equipment in place to accept nuclear armed aircraft and provide them with maintenance and support for strikes. UOBs are air bases or other austere locations (such as highways – a capability routinely demonstrated by Allies for conventional air operations) suitable for launching strikes, but with no pre-positioned equipment or other indicators that they would host NATO strike aircraft prior to dispersal. The UOB concept is one developed by the U.S. Air Force for the European and Pacific operations, with more than 400 eligible bases and many, many more suitable austere locations.
Additional permanent stationing bases also should be considered, either by spreading the current arsenal of nuclear gravity bombs to more locations or deploying additional bombs from CONUS. Such a posture would make NATO nuclear forces more survivable if Allies were unable to disperse nuclear weapons before a Russian surprise attack. Such bases should be out of range of Russian forward artillery, however, locations further east or north of the Alliance would reduce the time to target.
Broader Participation in Conventional Support for Nuclear Operations (CSNO)
Broader participation in CSNO (formerly known as SNOWCAT) and related exercises will both improve the effectiveness of NATO nuclear forces and send a strong deterrence message through demonstration of political unity. CSNO is critical for the success of NATO’s nuclear mission, including fighter escort, refueling, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and suppression or destruction of enemy air defenses. It also includes indirect support, such as strategic lift, fuel, conventional ammunition, maintenance and repair, base support (guards, food, medical, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense), air and missile defenses, and other cyber, electronic warfare, and space-based enablers. Such support can be supplied by all Allies, including those with limited military capabilities. Strengthening of these capabilities is also needed for the conventional defense of Europe in case of conflict with Russia.
Improvement of NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Messaging
While NATO has improved its nuclear deterrence messaging in recent years, including by enhancing related in language in its summit declarations and declassifying the name of the annual Steadfast Noon nuclear exercise, these efforts have been too limited in scope. The Secretary General and SACEUR are still afforded with too little freedom to speak on these issues, while many Allies often either engage in muddled or contradictory messaging or refuse to discuss their reliance on (or participation in) NATO’s nuclear deterrence. More frequent and coherent nuclear messaging by NATO leadership and the Allies would help both deter Russia and assure Allied populations. NATO should also return to the routine practice of publishing communiques after significant Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meetings to provide transparency of its deterrence work.
Additionally, all Allies should make the public and political case for NATO’s nuclear deterrence policies and posture – including NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. Currently, too many Allies remain silent when Russia, China, and others criticize NATO in public fora. Allies must provide vocal support both in their own capitals and at other regional and international forums such as the Review Process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, all while Allies remaining united and vocal in their opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Development of NATO-wide Nuclear Resilience
One of the most important aspects of deterrence by denial is the ability to demonstrate full preparedness for worst-case scenarios – a short-notice Russian nuclear strike or limited regional nuclear exchanges. Required changes include hardening all critical airports and seaports (especially the pre-designated airports and seaports critical to NATO reinforcement) to operate in radiological environments. Allied armed forces require improved chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRN-D) protection, with an emphasis on the oft-neglected aspect of nuclear defense, both in Europe and in Allied and partner territory in Asia.
This work also would require all Allies to prepare their publics for the possibility of nuclear strikes, to update their strategic communications and national nuclear response readiness plans, and to exercise these regularly, both internally and at NATO. Such work must be carefully designed and intelligently executed to ensure this increases public confidence rather than increasing concern. It also should include the European Union and other European and Asian partner nations, which can contribute to necessary medical and CBRN-D capabilities.
Improvement of Allied IAMD
NATO’s lack of sufficiently connected and capable integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) against Russian/Belarusian nuclear strikes is a well-known capability shortfall. Russia’s war against Ukraine shows the need for forward-deployed IAMD, towards a vision of fully integrated air-space missile defense for the Euro-Atlantic region. Such a system would minimize Russia’s confidence in its ability to use a small number of nuclear armed missiles to penetrate NATO defenses for a limited “dosing” strike.
Improvements to NATO IAMD will require the purchase, deployment, and wide integration of systems to reduce vulnerabilities to Russia’s theatre strike dual-capable systems. Such work will require radars and mounted and portable air-defense systems closer to the borders of Russia and Belarus, as well as cruise missile detection and shoot-down capabilities, as well as counter-EW and counter-penetration capabilities. In longer-term, NATO should make similar enhancements to counter other threats, such as future longer-range Iranian missiles.
Enhanced Nuclear Planning and Exercising
After the end of the Cold War, NATO ceased its nuclear contingency planning, to which it returned only recently. NATO should accelerate its efforts to improve and integrate nuclear planning across all domains, including at SHAPE, at NATO HQ, and in Allied capitals – both within militaries and governments, and with the expert community. It must be integrated into every aspect of Alliance strategy and NATO’s new defense plans and build into NATO’s regular work. This work must include improved understanding of, and agreement upon, pre-delegation roles for SACEUR in increasing alert and survivability of nuclear forces in case of surprise attack.
The re-integration of conventional and nuclear exercises is also necessary and overdue. NATO segregated them after the end of the Cold War. Currently, NATO aims for coherence in its exercises, but this is insufficient and does not reflect the complexity of a potential conflict with Russia. Both field and headquarters exercises must reflect a holistic view across all domains.
Establishment of Additional Nuclear Delivery Systems
The effectiveness, and hence the credibility, of NATO nuclear deterrence would gain from theatre-range missiles that could strike deeper into Russia and with greater chance of penetrating air defenses than the DCA with gravity bombs. Prospective re-introduction of U.S. nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) will be a step in this direction, but, as an off-shore U.S. system, it will have limited value for joint NATO signaling and could be prioritized for deterrence missions in the Pacific instead of the Atlantic.
NATO Allies instead could work to develop nuclear-capable ALCMs, including replacing or supplementing the B61-12 with nuclear armed AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER). This would capitalize on the Allied investments being made in F-35As. Deployment of nuclear-capable missiles on mobile launchers, such as those carrying conventional Typhon Mid-Range Capability, would additionally improve survivability of NATO’s nuclear forces. Europeans could provide such a capability, potentially by modifying the conventional ground-launched cruise missile which is to be developed by France, Germany, Italy, and Poland.
Strengthening Conventional Response and Counterforce Options
NATO allies should provide SACEUR with enhanced conventional strike options, not just for purposes of conventional defense and supporting nuclear operations. They could be also employed to degrade Russian non-strategic nuclear forces or in retaliation to some scenarios of limited nuclear use (similarly to South Korean Kill Chain and Massive Punishment and Retaliation concepts). Both uses could occur either instead of NATO allies employing their nuclear weapons or in tandem with them. Relevant capabilities include conventionally armed cruise missiles launched from air, ground, and the sea, as well as longer-range artillery systems (e.g., Precision Strike Missile for HIMARs), airpower, and specially-trained covert penetration special operations forces. Integrated anti-submarine warfare would also help in preventing sea-launched non-strategic nuclear strikes.
Improved French and UK Contributions to NATO’s Nuclear Deterrent
Further steps can be taken to improve the French and UK contributions to NATO, including enlarging and diversifying their nuclear force postures. France could join in NATO nuclear planning, but as long as this remains unlikely, it could better coordinate its nuclear exercises (such as POKER) and related strategic communication, and regularly deploy French dual-capable aircraft and submarines to Allied bases. France also could share development of its ASMP-R, the latest generation of its ALCM, or transfer its outmoded ASMP-A to Allies. This would not include sharing warheads, but instead adapting U.S. warheads for delivery.
The UK also can play a role, perhaps in modifying some of its advanced ALCMs to deliver UK (or U.S.) nuclear warheads, or independently developing a SLCM-N assigned to the defense of the Alliance. It also can incorporate its nuclear exercises with NATO and invest in F-35As and have them certified as DCA, thus returning to a role it had in the Cold War.
Conclusion
While NATO allies do not need to match Russian nuclear capabilities warhead for warhead and system for system, they could do much more than they currently are doing to enhance nuclear deterrence. Russia likely will complain about all of these changes, claiming NATO is escalating and that Russia once again is the victim of NATO predations. But as Russia escalates its nuclear threats and aggressive actions, NATO members continue to show too much self-restraint. By maintaining an overly constrained and incremental approach to nuclear adaptation, the Allies are tolerating too much risk of deterrence failure. It is important for NATO to enact some, if not all, of farther-reaching options to improve NATO’s nuclear posture. In this regard, it is worth to recall a metaphor by Sir Michael Quinlan, who compared the development of NATO’s nuclear posture with building a solid roof: ‘it cannot be doubted that the roof needed pillars; and that it was safer with too many than with too few.’
