Editor’s Note: Mohammad Salami, a young Pakistani academic, is a frequent contributor to Stimson on Iran’s economic problems and has a particular focus on the energy sector.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Two of its neighbors have historically vied for influence in Iraq – Iran, whose new President Masoud Pezeshkian is due in Baghdad today — and Turkey, which recently signed a memorandum of understanding with Iraq on military, security, and counter-terrorism cooperation.
The MoU, which followed a historic visit to Iraq in April by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is a significant maneuver intended to solidify Turkey’s influence in Iraq. By labeling the Kurdish Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK a “banned organization,” Turkey seeks to legitimize its cross-border operations and strengthen its foothold in Iraqi politics and security.
According to a copy of the memorandum which was reached after two days of high-level talks in Ankara, Iraq and Turkey intend to coordinate efforts to “protect their security and national interests and promote security, military, and intelligence coordination through the exchange of information about terrorist organizations.”
Turkey, which opposes the aspirations of its own large Kurdish minority, has been carrying out cross-border military incursions targeting the PKK in northern Iraq since the 1980s.
Labeling the PKK as a “common threat” and a “banned organization” signals a new measure intended to legitimize and elevate Turkey’s “war on terror.” The two countries also agreed to set up a joint security coordination center in Baghdad, falling under a Joint Operations Command.
The agreement is not without controversy. Pro-Iranian Iraqi militia groups have criticized the MoU. On Aug. 23, a Turkish airstrike killed two women journalists and injured a male colleague in a car near Said Sadiq, a town between Sulaimaniyah and Halabja. A week later, the Iraqi military shot down a Turkish drone over the Kurdish-majority city of Kirkuk.
It appears that the new deal was partially propelled by a “strategic water agreement” between Iraq and Turkey, as indicated by a spokesperson for the Iraqi government.
Water has been a longstanding reason for disputes between the two nations, as both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which originate in Turkey, are crucial water sources for Iraq. Baghdad contends that Turkish dams are depleting its water levels, while Ankara counters that Iraq must improve its outdated irrigation infrastructure to achieve more efficient water usage.
The security agreement also comes on top of a monumental $17 billion economic deal with Iraq, intended to forge a pivotal corridor between Asia and Europe through Turkey called the Development Road.
Turkey’s strong industrial foothold in the Middle East positions it to expand market share, increase output, and drive profits—ultimately reducing inflation, boosting employment, and solidifying its economic foundation. More strategically for Erdogan, the Development Road project might help Turkey and Baghdad erode Kurdish autonomy and weaken PKK resistance. At a recent summit with Iraq, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in Turkey, officials discussed how to expedite the project, according to Turkey’s minister of transportation and infrastructure.
Turkish influence in Iraq was quite strong under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, with multiple investments and significant trade. Since the 2003 U.S. intervention and toppling of Saddam’s regime, however, Iran has entrenched itself in Iraqi politics, backing over a dozen political parties and funding and training their aligned paramilitary groups.
The Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) has emerged as Iraq’s dominant political and institutional power. Militias that are part of the PMF have long chafed at the continued U.S. military presence in Iraq and aim to expel the United States from Iraq. Iran-backed militias have carried out at least 160 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria since regional tensions rose in the aftermath of the Hamas attack on Israel last Oct. 7 and the ensuing Israeli war on Gaza.
Groups such as Iraqi Hezbollah have also fiercely slammed the Development Road project, calling it “a continued source of concern.” A representative from the parliamentary bloc representing the Iran-backed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq militia described the project as a “stain in the history of Iraqi politicians,” adding, “This project is yet another cost borne by the Iraqi people due to a political class infected with a corruption virus, rendering them unable to differentiate between harm and benefit.”
However, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has confirmed that the PMF signed off on the new security MoU and its labeling of the PKK.
Iran has historically leveraged a network of proxies, such as Shi’ite militias and other non-state actors, to exert influence in Iraq. This proxy strategy enables Iran to maintain plausible deniability while exerting considerable influence over Iraq’s politics and security, aligning with its broader asymmetric warfare tactics to counter conventional adversaries across the Middle East.
Turkish-Iraqi relations have been largely driven by disputes over Turkey’s military incursions, water rights, and the sale of Kurdish oil. The oil disputes date to 2013 when the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began exporting oil to Turkey independently, a move that Baghdad deemed unlawful. The central Iraqi government retaliated by suspending federal payments to KRG public servants. In 2023, the International Court of Arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce ruled in favor of Iraq in a pivotal arbitration case against Turkey regarding Kurdish oil exports.
In recent years, Turkey has outpaced Iran as a leading exporter of commercial goods to Iraq. Turkish firms have invested in numerous construction and infrastructure projects across Iraqi cities, spanning sectors such as energy, water, and petrochemicals.
Turkey traditionally has had extensive influence in northern Iraq, where it competes with Iran. Each supports different Kurdish political parties. Turkey backs the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) while Iran supports the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Geographically, the KDP controls areas near the Turkish border, while the PUK controls regions close to Iran.
Sinjar, home to Iraq’s Yazidi minority, has become a center of intrigue and conflict. It serves as a strategic battleground for a variety of nations, armed factions, and spies seeking to cement their various patrons’ influence. Turkey and Iran have emerged as the predominant powers in Sinjar, while Turkey also focuses on Mosul, Kirkuk, and Duhok, which are rich in oil and which have been the target of Turkish territorial aspirations in the past.
Binar FK is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Keough School of Global Affairs and a Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, USA. Currently based in Washington, D.C., he formerly worked in journalism, covering wars and conflicts in the Middle East for a decade, with a focus on extremist groups such as ISIL, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other militias.
Editor’s Note: Mohammad Salami, a young Pakistani academic, is a frequent contributor to Stimson on Iran’s economic problems and has a particular focus on the energy sector.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Two of its neighbors have historically vied for influence in Iraq – Iran, whose new President Masoud Pezeshkian is due in Baghdad today — and Turkey, which recently signed a memorandum of understanding with Iraq on military, security, and counter-terrorism cooperation.
The MoU, which followed a historic visit to Iraq in April by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is a significant maneuver intended to solidify Turkey’s influence in Iraq. By labeling the Kurdish Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK a “banned organization,” Turkey seeks to legitimize its cross-border operations and strengthen its foothold in Iraqi politics and security.
According to a copy of the memorandum which was reached after two days of high-level talks in Ankara, Iraq and Turkey intend to coordinate efforts to “protect their security and national interests and promote security, military, and intelligence coordination through the exchange of information about terrorist organizations.”
Turkey, which opposes the aspirations of its own large Kurdish minority, has been carrying out cross-border military incursions targeting the PKK in northern Iraq since the 1980s.
Labeling the PKK as a “common threat” and a “banned organization” signals a new measure intended to legitimize and elevate Turkey’s “war on terror.” The two countries also agreed to set up a joint security coordination center in Baghdad, falling under a Joint Operations Command.
The agreement is not without controversy. Pro-Iranian Iraqi militia groups have criticized the MoU. On Aug. 23, a Turkish airstrike killed two women journalists and injured a male colleague in a car near Said Sadiq, a town between Sulaimaniyah and Halabja. A week later, the Iraqi military shot down a Turkish drone over the Kurdish-majority city of Kirkuk.
It appears that the new deal was partially propelled by a “strategic water agreement” between Iraq and Turkey, as indicated by a spokesperson for the Iraqi government.
Water has been a longstanding reason for disputes between the two nations, as both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which originate in Turkey, are crucial water sources for Iraq. Baghdad contends that Turkish dams are depleting its water levels, while Ankara counters that Iraq must improve its outdated irrigation infrastructure to achieve more efficient water usage.
The security agreement also comes on top of a monumental $17 billion economic deal with Iraq, intended to forge a pivotal corridor between Asia and Europe through Turkey called the Development Road.
Turkey’s strong industrial foothold in the Middle East positions it to expand market share, increase output, and drive profits—ultimately reducing inflation, boosting employment, and solidifying its economic foundation. More strategically for Erdogan, the Development Road project might help Turkey and Baghdad erode Kurdish autonomy and weaken PKK resistance. At a recent summit with Iraq, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in Turkey, officials discussed how to expedite the project, according to Turkey’s minister of transportation and infrastructure.
Turkish influence in Iraq was quite strong under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, with multiple investments and significant trade. Since the 2003 U.S. intervention and toppling of Saddam’s regime, however, Iran has entrenched itself in Iraqi politics, backing over a dozen political parties and funding and training their aligned paramilitary groups.
The Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) has emerged as Iraq’s dominant political and institutional power. Militias that are part of the PMF have long chafed at the continued U.S. military presence in Iraq and aim to expel the United States from Iraq. Iran-backed militias have carried out at least 160 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria since regional tensions rose in the aftermath of the Hamas attack on Israel last Oct. 7 and the ensuing Israeli war on Gaza.
Groups such as Iraqi Hezbollah have also fiercely slammed the Development Road project, calling it “a continued source of concern.” A representative from the parliamentary bloc representing the Iran-backed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq militia described the project as a “stain in the history of Iraqi politicians,” adding, “This project is yet another cost borne by the Iraqi people due to a political class infected with a corruption virus, rendering them unable to differentiate between harm and benefit.”
However, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has confirmed that the PMF signed off on the new security MoU and its labeling of the PKK.
Iran has historically leveraged a network of proxies, such as Shi’ite militias and other non-state actors, to exert influence in Iraq. This proxy strategy enables Iran to maintain plausible deniability while exerting considerable influence over Iraq’s politics and security, aligning with its broader asymmetric warfare tactics to counter conventional adversaries across the Middle East.
Turkish-Iraqi relations have been largely driven by disputes over Turkey’s military incursions, water rights, and the sale of Kurdish oil. The oil disputes date to 2013 when the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began exporting oil to Turkey independently, a move that Baghdad deemed unlawful. The central Iraqi government retaliated by suspending federal payments to KRG public servants. In 2023, the International Court of Arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce ruled in favor of Iraq in a pivotal arbitration case against Turkey regarding Kurdish oil exports.
In recent years, Turkey has outpaced Iran as a leading exporter of commercial goods to Iraq. Turkish firms have invested in numerous construction and infrastructure projects across Iraqi cities, spanning sectors such as energy, water, and petrochemicals.
Turkey traditionally has had extensive influence in northern Iraq, where it competes with Iran. Each supports different Kurdish political parties. Turkey backs the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) while Iran supports the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Geographically, the KDP controls areas near the Turkish border, while the PUK controls regions close to Iran.
Sinjar, home to Iraq’s Yazidi minority, has become a center of intrigue and conflict. It serves as a strategic battleground for a variety of nations, armed factions, and spies seeking to cement their various patrons’ influence. Turkey and Iran have emerged as the predominant powers in Sinjar, while Turkey also focuses on Mosul, Kirkuk, and Duhok, which are rich in oil and which have been the target of Turkish territorial aspirations in the past.
Binar FK is a Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Keough School of Global Affairs and a Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, USA. Currently based in Washington, D.C., he formerly worked in journalism, covering wars and conflicts in the Middle East for a decade, with a focus on extremist groups such as ISIL, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other militias.
