Algeria is poised for a presidential election on Sept. 7 that, while seemingly predetermined, reveals the complexities of a political landscape profoundly shaped by popular disillusionment following the failure of the Hirak movement. These peaceful protests, which in 2019 rekindled hopes for democratic renewal by pressuring then President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to resign after 20 years in office, also allowed his successor, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, to present himself as the architect of what he called a “New Algeria,” in which he would be an efficient, proactive president who would end corruption and promote redistribution.
Five years on, Tebboune’s new slogan, “For a victorious Algeria,” aims at promising a second term based on the “continuation of the social state.” This attempt by the incumbent president to renew a social contract based on populist promises of a neoliberal economic renewal, however, is colliding with the lack of institutional reforms necessary to achieve them.
The run-up to the election
Reflecting the complex post-Hirak landscape, Tebboune has been supported by a heterogeneous coalition that includes remnants of Bouteflika’s old networks, emerging figures capitalizing on the void left by the former regime’s fall, technocrats seeking administrative stability, and economic actors attracted by promises of reform and continuity. His late announcement of his candidacy and the government reshuffle favoring his loyalists are less about classic power consolidation and more about an effort to reconfigure internal regime balances.
As for the military establishment, while maintaining a low profile, it has adopted a “remote control” approach, allowing Tebboune to maintain the facade of civilian power while preserving its behind-the-scenes influence. Initially planned as a transitional solution to the Hirak crisis, he has gradually sought to establish himself for the long term. To consolidate his position as the “army’s candidate,” he has accepted and encouraged several significant constitutional reforms concerning the military’s role. These include expanding its mission to include “defending the country’s vital and strategic interests” (Article 30 of the 2020 Constitution), authorizing the deployment of troops abroad with parliamentary approval (Article 91), and strengthening the role of the High Security Council, chaired by the president.
In a sign of his bid for the indispensable support of the military, Tebboune has adopted a security-focused approach to manage dissent, marked by numerous arrests for “crimes of opinion” as well as the systematic delegitimization of potential rival candidates. Even figures long connected to the army and secret services have been prevented from running.
On the regional front, growing tensions with Morocco and the latter’s alignment with the Israel-US axis could have offered Algeria an opportunity to play a significant role and position itself as an alternative voice. However, unlike Bouteflika, who aimed for international stature, Tebboune’s administrative background and inward focus on domestic affairs have limited Algeria’s ability to impose a new foreign policy paradigm.
Electoral promises in a context of limited political participation
As the majority of Algerians turn away from political parties, which face an even greater struggle to mobilize support after the Hirak, participation in presidential elections, even without hope of winning, has become a currency of exchange between the parties and the president. The parties have legitimized Tebboune’s purported openness in exchange for their political survival. Thus, two parties presenting themselves as “opposition,” the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), represented by Youcef Aouchiche, and the Islamist-leaning Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), headed by Abdelaali Hassani Cherif, which had denounced the president’s election in 2019, now consider it necessary to “play the game” to maintain their relevance through campaigns targeting the population, media, and institutions.
To legitimize this governance model, President Tebboune has relied in the run-up to the elections, as his predecessors did, on strong nationalist rhetoric, presenting himself as the “father of the nation,” with his supporters now calling him ami Tebboune (Uncle Tebboune). However, this is not merely an exercise in legitimizing power; these elections also serve as a barometer for the regime to map areas of support and competition. For instance, low participation in the northern region of Kabylia during the 2021 local elections led to a revision of regional policies, demonstrating how the regime uses electoral data to maintain control in potentially unstable areas. This mapping process allows for the identification and anticipation of contested areas, particularly in sensitive regions like Kabylia and the south, where tensions over identity and economic inequalities are more severe.
Getting one’s share rather than having economic rights
To shore up domestic support, Tebboune has taken advantage of the windfall from rising natural gas exports to Europe following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. With the increased revenue, which nearly doubled from $35 billion in 2021 to $60 billion in 2022, he has boosted social spending without being forced to cut military expenditure or carry out potentially painful economic reforms. The president’s economic narrative, centered on promoting entrepreneurship and startups and embodied in initiatives like the National Startup Fund launched in 2020, aims to redefine the citizen-state relationship through a neoliberal prism, prioritizing individual economic initiative over collective rights and welfare. But the increasing limitations on Algerians’ economic rights since 2019 — including restrictions on union freedoms, constraints on the right to strike, and inadequate social protections — expose the fragility of Tebboune’s social contract. This discrepancy is further highlighted by the persistent role of the informal economy, which continues to serve as a crucial space for negotiating de facto economic rights that the state struggles to guarantee formally.
While the presidential campaign mobilized the same traditional networks of imams, bureaucrats, and small civil society front organizations that the late President Bouteflika used in his time, President Tebboune has assured during his meetings that everyone will have “their share.” He aims to secure popular support by promising various increases, such as to the unemployment allowance, which rose from 12,000 dinars at the beginning of his term to a promised 20,000 dinars (around $150), higher pensions, and interest-free loans for startups. In the absence of adherence to an ideological project, the most modest social classes, including the unemployed, retirees, and students, have little choice but to welcome these announcements, even if they know the measures perpetuate economic dependence, fail to address broader structural inequalities, and fuel already significant inflation.
A stable second mandate, but for how long?
Tebboune’s upcoming second term seems to offer an illusion of stability, supported by an authoritarian populism striving to maintain a fragile social contract that cannot be indefinitely renewed on such shaky foundations, especially when it relies on ad hoc measures rather than deep structural reforms. Perceived as an antidote to a potential resurgence of protest movements, it rather reveals how the hasty reconstruction of the state apparatus post-Bouteflika has created a patchwork of sometimes contradictory interests and visions, making it difficult to develop a coherent project for the country’s future. More concerning, this focus on short-term stability prevents any serious discussion of the issue of presidential succession — a critical concern given that Tebboune is 79.
Ultimately, Algeria’s major challenge lies in its capacity to transcend this short-term governance model. Without a substantial overhaul of the social contract and political openness, Algeria risks finding itself at an impasse, where today’s temporary solutions will only exacerbate tomorrow’s crises.
Amel Boubekeur is a sociologist at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) and a Non-Resident Scholar with MEI’s North Africa and the Sahel Program. Her research focuses on the political scenes of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), Euro-Arab relations, and Islam in Europe.
Photo by AFP via Getty Images
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